China seeks to evacuate citizens from Ukraine but will not criticize Russia — China-Russia weekly update
The official rhetoric from Beijing about the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24 is changing as some 5,000 Chinese people in Kyiv and beyond make plans to leave.
China yesterday expressed concern about the safety of its nationals in Ukraine, and stated that it is coordinating arrangements to evacuate them, in a statement (in Chinese) of support for “diplomatic efforts that are conducive to the peaceful resolution of the Ukrainian crisis.”
About 1,000 Chinese citizens have been “safely relocated” according to today’s press briefing from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- There are probably around 5,000 citizens still in Ukraine, mostly in Kyiv, Odessa, and Kharkiv.
- The Chinese embassy in Ukraine today published a notice of a Kyiv-to-Warsaw evacuation train, mostly to inform Chinese citizens of an evacuation opportunity, but also, possibly, to warn Russia not to attack the train.
Have Russian forces been ordered to look out for Chinese interests? There is some evidence that Putin has carefully considered Chinese interests to date:
- The invasion did not start until after the conclusion of the Winter Olympics, while the final days of the Russia/Belarus “Allied Resolve” exercises were timed to coincide with the conclusion of the Games on February 20.
- Moscow may have told Beijing to expect a swift end to the invasion: China’s embassy in Ukraine initially told its citizens there to place a Chinese flag on their vehicles, but then — as it became clearer that Russian forces would not swiftly take over the country — changed its advice, warning them not to reveal their identity because Ukrainians may believe that China supports the Russian invasion.
Has China shifted from “pro-Russia neutrality”?
East Asia scholar and Obama-era security adviser Evan Medeiros wrote earlier this week that “[Beijing is] clearly privileging their alignment with Russia and pursuing something I would call pro-Russia neutrality.”
- This fundamental posture hasn’t changed: Foreign Minister Wáng Yì 王毅 had a phone call today with the Ukrainian foreign minister, Dmytro Kuleba. The Financial Times reported that Wang had said China “‘deplored’ the outbreak of conflict in its strongest comments yet on the war,” but Chinese state voices like nationalist former Global Times editor Hú Xījìn 胡锡进 rushed to point out:
Wang Yi didn’t “deplore” the outbreak of conflict. He used the Chinese word tòngxī 痛惜, which means deeply grieved. More important, 痛惜 doesn’t include the meaning of criticism.
- In the call, Wang also adopted Moscow’s talking points about how security cannot be strengthened at the expense of other countries, regional security cannot be achieved through military blocs, etc.
- Official language does seem to have shifted in tone somewhat, apparently with the intention of portraying China as a responsible international player.
It may be more useful to pay attention to what Beijing does, not to what it says: The P.R.C. yesterday voted with Russia at the UN Human Rights Council against holding a debate on the Ukraine crisis.
- Beijing may seek a greater diplomatic role in the conflict due to its own interests, but there is no indication it will abandon its pro-Moscow orientation.
War updates
Russian military expert Michael Kofman published an informative podcast yesterday titled “Interpreting the first few days of the Russo-Ukrainian war.” Kofman and other Russian military experts, such as Dara Massicot and Rob Lee, are generally congealing around the following assessments:
- Putin planned to conduct a lightning strike, take Kyiv, and neutralize the Ukrainian political leadership.
- Putin’s hopes for a quick war were dashed due to a stout defense by the Ukrainians and poor initial execution from the Russian military. Some Russian units are running out of fuel, food, and water; astonishingly, there are highly credible reports that some Russian units are communicating unsecured, without digital mode — meaning that anyone can listen in.
- However, it is still far too early to write off the Russian military, which is heavily favored to take Kyiv and other major Ukrainian cities, albeit at great cost.
- Russia’s precision-guided munitions (PGM) stocks are dwindling, leaving Russian forces with less accurate munitions that are more likely to destroy civilian infrastructure and kill non-combatants.
Having failed to secure a quick victory, Putin is left with two extremely risky choices: Should he launch a devastating urban warfare campaign, or deescalate? If Putin further escalates, he will risk a military disaster — and probably the end of his regime; on the other hand, deescalating would prove to be an extraordinarily humiliating climbdown and could also lead to regime change.
Most analysts believe that Putin will continue to escalate — although Russian forces are currently paused outside Kyiv. Of course, war has a momentum of its own and sporadic, often horrific violence continues in major cities.
Gazprom seeks deal with Moscow
Gazprom says it has signed a contract to design the Power of Siberia-2 (PoS-2) pipeline, which will supply natural gas to China.
This deal is commercially unimportant, as Gazprom inked a deal with an engineering firm — not a Chinese buyer. Still, the design contract may be politically significant, as Moscow appears to be pressing Beijing for additional financial and political support.
Beijing can’t be too happy with the contract’s timing: While it may still be willing to support Moscow financially, it prefers to minimize publicity as much as possible and will likely avoid splashy infrastructure deals for at least several months. Given the West’s (particularly Europe’s) furious and decisive reaction to Putin’s invasion, Beijing will tread carefully around overt trade and investment links to Moscow.
