Beijing and Tokyo calm the waters of the East China Sea — at least for today

Chinese and Japanese officials held formal security talks for the first time in four years, in a bid to stabilize increasingly strained relations amid geopolitical tensions with the U.S. and territorial disputes over Taiwan and the South China Sea.

Tokyo voiced concerns over China’s cooperation with Russia, its high-altitude balloon program, and military aggression towards Taiwan, while Beijing warned against Japan’s growing defenses. Both sides also said that they would work to establish a direct security hotline between their two countries by this spring.

“The dialogue comes at a time when Japan faces the need to deal with China’s rapid military modernization and buildup, as well as uncertainties surrounding China’s intentions,” Naoko Aoki, an associate political scientist at RAND Corporation, told The China Project today. “I think from the Chinese perspective, this was an opportunity to try to gauge just how much the Kishida administration intends to side with the United States in terms of its approach to China.”

Last week, China’s top diplomat Wáng Yì 王毅 told Japanese Foreign Minister Yoshimasa Hayashi that Japan should “make independent choices,” while also hitting back at “unilateralism, decoupling, and severing industrial and supply chains.”

The talks come after the two nations marked the 50th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic relations last year, and in anticipation of the upcoming 45th anniversary of the Japan-China Treaty of Peace and Friendship this year.

Japan’s biggest concerns with China

Japan has long faced security and economic issues with China, but three core issues have increased concerns to new heights in recent years.

One of the main issues is a decades-long territorial dispute over what Japan calls the Senkaku Islands, which China calls the Diaoyu Islands (钓鱼岛 diàoyú dǎo). Both sides lay claim over the small group of uninhabited islands in the East China Sea, approximately 170 kilometers (106 miles) east of Taiwan.

Concerns have also been rising in Japan over China’s military buildup, both in an increase in Beijing’s defense spending, and a surge in the PLA’s military activities against Taiwan and in the South China Sea. In the wake of Russia’s attack on Ukraine, Tokyo is worried that Beijing will take control of Taiwan by force. Japan and the Philippines also agreed to sharply boost their defense ties by granting Japanese troops greater access to Philippine territory earlier this month, days before a Chinese naval ship aimed a blinding laser at a Philippines vessel in disputed waters.

“Japan’s former Prime Minister Abe was the first person who conceptualized the free and open Indo-Pacific idea,” Kristin Vekasi, associate professor of political science at the University of Maine, told The China Project today. “And there’s the sort of the way it’s framed in Japan is this broad strategic concern about having freedom of the seas, freedom of trade, freedom of movement through that area — that’s really an important piece for Japan’s prosperity, as well as the way they’re thinking about security.”

Japan is also embroiled in a territorial dispute with Russia, a country which China has signaled greater cooperation with despite Western pressure over the war in Ukraine. In November 2022, Japan voiced “severe concerns” over Russia-China joint air patrols in the East China Sea.

Meanwhile, earlier this month, Chinese Foreign Minister Qín Gāng 秦刚 told his Japanese counterpart that China hopes that Japan will “uphold an objective and rational perception of China, honor its commitments on major issues such as history and Taiwan, be discreet with its words and deeds, act prudently in the field of military security, and stop right-wing forces from provoking on the Diaoyu Islands issue.”

Japan reinterprets Article 9 in a major shift in defense policy

In December, Japan announced that it would double its defense spending over the next five years to 2% of its GDP, in an effort to deter China’s growing military might. Japan also described China as “the greatest strategic challenge” to Japan’s peace and security.

Since 1976, Japan has limited military spending to 1% of its GDP and does not have a military force dedicated to offensive warfare under a post-World War II constitution known as Article 9, which states that “the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.” However, Japan has still funded an extensive self-defense program.

But in 2017, then-prime minister Shinzo Abe removed the 1% ceiling. The major increase in defense spending will bring Japan, a strategic partner of NATO, in line with the guidelines for members to spend at least 2% of GDP on defense each year.

“When Shinzo Abe was Prime Minister, he championed the revision of Article 9 for a number of reasons, including the geopolitical threats posed by North Korea and China. In addition, this was to appease Abe’s own domestic constituency, which included historical revisionists seeking to whitewash Japanese military atrocities in World War II,” Emily Matson, an adjunct professorial lecturer at American University, told The China Project today.

“Since Abe’s assassination, a significant number of politicians within the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) have continued to take this stance, including current Prime Minister Fumio Kishida,” Matson added. “This, in turn, has contributed to increasing Chinese concern about the return of the specter of Japanese militarism, and the Chinese government is at present leveraging this rhetoric to both prop up the CCP domestically and place the blame for China’s contemporary challenges primarily on the legacy of foreign imperialism.”

Beijing, on the other hand, increased defense spending by 7.1% last year, or more than four times as much as Japan.

Even Japan’s left is leaning towards more defensive posturing

Prior to the landmark shift in its defense budget, Japan held two big elections in 2021. Campaign rhetoric in both of these elections showed more criticisms towards China, signaling that Japan is becoming more assertive in its national security and economic policies.

In Japan’s general election in October 2021, “there was a real strong shift across the full political spectrum for more support for a stronger defensive posture,” Vekasi told The China Project. “It’s not a stark structural change, but even in the more leftist parties, there is more concern about China as a security threat, as maybe human rights threat, and also concerns about Taiwan. So there’s just building consensus in Japan that a stronger security posture is probably necessary.”

A survey by NHK, Japan’s public broadcaster, from the 2021 elections showed that almost 40% of running candidates from the left-leaning Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP) supported increased defense spending. While only 5% CDP candidates supported the constitutional revision of Article 9, it still marked “a large amount of support for Article 9, which in the past has really been a core part of leftist politics,” Vekasi added.

Meanwhile, public opinion of China has plummeted in Japan. Over 80% of the Japanese public consistently reported a negative impression of China, according to a 2020 survey by Genron NPO. That figure rose to 90% in 2021.

Komeito’s conciliatory tone toward China and power at the top

While Japan’s left-leaning political parties have shifted their stance on defense policies, an often-overlooked political party has emerged as a key player in how Japan will chart its relationship with China: The Komeito, the coalition party of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), has long held more conciliatory views towards China. It also holds significant influence over Japan’s government.

“Some of the strong political constituencies for having better relations with China come from the party Komeito. They’re really key to the LDP’s continued dominance in Japanese politics,” Vekasi told The China Project. “The party acts as, not a pacifying force, but a calming force within elite politics. So I think that’s really important, there’d be more of a bias toward the status quo of continuing to work with China in part because of the Komeito.”

“At the same time, we start to see these real shifts on the left. In Japan, even though it has largely one party rule, it is a multi-party democracy. And these minority positions in elite politics really matter for what Japan is going to do,” Vekasi added. “So those domestic changes, I really think deserve some more focus outside of the ruling coalition.”

The U.S. is Japan’s biggest security ally, but China is its “neighbor forever”

Japan’s hardening security stance comes amid growing tensions between the U.S., its greatest ally, and China, its 1.4 billion-strong neighbor.

“Japan is just in this really, really difficult spot. The United States is its most important security partner, as well as the most important partner in a lot of respects — there’s a lot of importance in Japan placed on the shared values, shared democratic norms with the United States,” Vekasi told The China Project. “And we’ve seen, over the last couple of years, some more strident language from Japan on issues like Taiwan. Japan has long been a strong supporter of Taiwan, but it’s been more explicit than it has been in the past.”

Japan and the U.S. have openly criticized China’s increased military activities in the South China Sea and towards Taiwan. Japan also recently joined U.S.-led efforts in curbing China’s access to advanced semiconductor equipment.

“At the same time, Japan has really strong economic ties with China. China will be Japan’s neighbor forever. Japan needs to balance its needs for prosperity with its relations with close neighbors and its regional stability,” Vekasi told The China Project. “Japan is all in with the U.S.-Japan alliance. It’s a core part of Japan’s foreign policy and a security posture, but it involves some really, really tough choices.”

“But an important thing in Japanese politics is that there is still a constituency, particularly in the business community, to continue closer engagement with China. That constituency is not very publicly vocal, but they are privately vocal. And that hasn’t shifted as much as it shifted perhaps in the United States or maybe other countries,” Vekasi added.