Beware the Taiwan election

The visits to China by climate czar John Kerry and other senior U.S. officials are welcome relief from recent darker days in U.S.-China relations. But during my recent visit to Beijing and Tianjin, it became clear that a chasm separates the sides’ views of an acceptable bilateral relationship. The U.S. seeks rules of the game to govern military policies in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea; Beijing will have none of it.

In that context, next January’s presidential election in Taiwan has the potential to trigger a crisis. China has strong reservations about the front-running, pro-independence candidate, current Vice President William Lai (賴淸德 Lài Qīngdé). Each side believes the other will interfere in the vote. This overlay of tensions could come to a head late this year, or early in 2024.

My last visit to China had been in January of 2020, at the very beginning of the COVID pandemic. My visit this month revealed that the country has perceptibly moved in an autocratic direction. It has become noticeably more commonplace for interlocutors to quote President Xí Jìnpíng 习近平 as a show of fidelity to the government. The views of some analysts whom I have known for years have become more hardline. Others bemoaned the new climate in which they had to be very careful about what they say in public. Among that group, there is real worry about both the quality of information that the top leadership is receiving and the lack of debate over policy.

That lack of debate is particularly worrisome given that Beijing and Washington hold incompatible views of their relationship. “Managed competition” is the U.S. goal. The U.S. seeks rules of the game, especially for military activity in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, and in the air above both bodies of water. Washington correctly emphasizes that its presence there is fully consistent with international law. The U.S. also holds that high level military to military communication is necessary to prevent accidents and unintended escalation.

China rejects the notion of strategic competition, arguing that the U.S. is trying to win that competition and defeat China without really knowing what victory means. China also rejects attempts to formulate “guardrails” or rules of the game for military activity in the Indo-Pacific region, believing that such measures would legitimize aggressive U.S. behavior and undermine China’s capacity to deter it. Accordingly, China resists senior military-to-military communication. (The meeting between Chinese ambassador to the U.S. Xiè Fēng 谢锋 and top DOD official Eli Rattner on July 12 was a small step in the right direction, but a far cry from a breakthrough.)

But there was a near-miss over the South China Sea on May 26 when a Chinese fighter buzzed an American plane, and one at sea in the Taiwan Strait on June 3 when a Chinese vessel veered in front of an American boat. The near-misses appear to have been dangerous moves by China to brush back the U.S. military and strengthen deterrence in the region. The incidents clearly demonstrate the need for high-level military communication — but given the Chinese viewpoint that is unlikely to happen any time soon, and we should expect more of these episodes in the future.

Beijing is increasingly bold

The Chinese side does not seem to appreciate that these gambits are extremely dangerous. If there were an accident, particularly one in which U.S. service members lost their lives, it would ignite the bipartisan hardline towards China in Washington — creating a real danger of escalation.

One of my harder-line interlocutors explained Chinese behavior as the product of dynamics within the People’s Liberation Army. He stated that the Army is eager to fight over Taiwan. The Chinese military has become increasingly bold in recent times, continued this interlocutor, a trend that has produced the near-misses. That is a worrisome view.

The approaching Taiwanese presidential election could cause a confrontation between the U.S. and China. Beijing holds that moves towards Taiwanese independence cross a redline. William Lai is the early favorite with a solid lead in opinion polls. Chinese interlocutors with whom I met saw Lai as anathema to China’s interests, given his strong pro-independence track record. Most of them claimed that the U.S. either is already supporting or will support Lai’s campaign. That view, whether accurate or not, will probably escalate tensions as the campaign proceeds.

This is how it could start

Both sides want Xi and President Joe Biden to meet at the G20 summit in September and at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting in November. Given that, they are likely to cap tensions to ensure that those meetings occur.

But beginning in November, escalating significantly if Lai wins in January, and running at least through May, when the Taiwanese president-elect is inaugurated and lays out cross-Strait policy, tensions would be high and could boil over — all in the context of no high-level military-to-military communication. The most likely initial events in a crisis could take the form of Chinese cyber-attacks against Taiwan, economic measures, live-fire military exercises, or enactment of an air defense identification zone. If those don’t work, Beijing could escalate to a partial or complete blockade of the Taiwan Strait or the island itself — though these steps are unlikely as a blockade is tantamount to a declaration of war. The measures could be taken before or after the election, the targets would be Taiwanese voters, Lai, and his inner circle, and the goal would be to compel a milder view on independence.

After May, assuming no blockade occurred, a new equilibrium would form but with tensions at a higher level. Lai would pursue greater defense cooperation with the U.S. and more visits by members of Congress. China would respond with forms of coercive diplomacy.

What Washington should do

U.S. diplomacy will need to show skill and subtlety in coming months to help avoid a crisis. The Biden administration must keep its fingerprints off the Taiwan election, in part by carefully crafting public statements to avoid the appearance of choosing sides. In addition, it should communicate to Congress the hazards of backing any candidate. The administration should also emphasize to Beijing that it must respect Taiwanese democracy, regardless of its views on the ultimate disposition of Taiwan. Washington should call out and loudly object to any interference in this election.

Finally, the Biden team will need multiple lines of open communication with Beijing. That’s especially true if, as is likely, military to military communication remains very limited. The U.S. administration should seek to ensure that personal and bureaucratic contacts remain open, especially those established in recent and future visits by official delegations to both capitals. The U.S. faces a witches’ brew of security and election-related tensions in coming months and will need to manage the relationship with China very carefully.